第二章 · Chapter 2
一个独一无二的市场 · A Market Like No Other
Everyone believes their market is special; exceptionalism is, ironically, a near-universal affliction. China’s case stands apart—because of structure, not sentiment. No other market harnesses the following five forces with comparable intensity: sheer scale and growth; blistering speed; adventurous young consumers; unmatched supply chain efficiency and depth; and a culture of relentless, sometimes ruthless, competition. Only in China do they interact at this magnitude. Together, they form not just a market but a singular ecosystem—one that reshapes every company that enters it. We return to these characteristics not because they’re new but because they’re enduring phenomena. They’re systemic, defining, and decisive in shaping China’s economy—and are increasingly felt worldwide.
每个人都相信自己的市场独一无二;讽刺的是,"例外主义"几乎是全球通病。中国的案例之所以突出——是因为结构,而非情感。没有任何其他市场能以同等的强度同时释放以下五种力量:纯粹的规模与增长;惊人的速度;勇于尝鲜的年轻消费者;无与伦比的供应链效率与深度;以及一种永不停歇、有时甚至残酷无情的竞争文化。只有在中国的市场上,它们才以这样的量级相互作用。它们合在一起,不只是一个市场,更是一个独一无二的生态系统——一个重塑每个进入者的生态系统。我们反复提及这些特征,不是因为它们新鲜,而是因为它们是持久的现象。它们是系统性的、定义性的,在塑造中国经济方面具有决定性——并且正日益被全世界感受到。
中国小提琴的故事
The Story of Chinese Violins
By coincidence we both play string instruments—and our childhood experience of “trading up” to obtain better and better musical gear captures the essence of how China innovates. Nick remembers visiting Zurich’s Jecklin shop as a boy for a rite of passage: graduating from the half- and three-quarter-size Chinese student violins that he’d started on to a “proper” full-size French violin.
巧合的是,我们俩都会拉弦乐器——而童年时代"以旧换新"、不断升级更好乐器的经历,恰好捕捉了中国式创新的精髓。梁敦临记得小时候去苏黎世的 Jecklin 琴行完成一个"成人礼":从他起步用的二分之一和四分之三尺寸的中国学生琴,升级到一把"正经的"全尺寸法国小提琴。
As a teenager, Joe—far more accomplished on the cello than Nick ever was on the violin—played in the Tanglewood Institute Summer Orchestra when Yo-Yo Ma dropped in to perform a Shostakovich concerto. By then, Joe had also moved on from a Chinese cello to a French instrument; of course, Yo-Yo played his priceless Stradivarius, and Joe still displays in his living room a photo of him standing alongside the cello master.
少年时代,倪以理——他的大提琴造诣远超梁的小提琴——在坦格尔伍德学院夏季乐团演奏时,马友友(Yo-Yo Ma)恰好来访,演出了一首肖斯塔科维奇协奏曲。那时,倪也已从一把中国大提琴换成了法国琴;当然,马友友演奏的是他价值连城的斯特拉迪瓦里,而倪至今还在客厅里摆着一张他与这位大提琴大师并肩而立的合影。
Where did these instruments originate? We’re familiar with the old world: Cremona, Italy, famous for nurturing a dense cluster of master luthiers stretching back to the sixteenth century. This quaint river town’s cobblestone streets have witnessed centuries of devotion to the singular craft of violin-making. Antonio Stradivari emerged from this tradition, before his death in 1737 producing about 1,100 violins, violas, cellos, and guitars using “only the wood of trees on which nightingales sang,” as a violin virtuoso would famously say. Centuries later, Stradivari’s violins command the highest prices, such as a $15.3 million sale in 2022.
这些乐器源自何方?我们对旧世界很熟悉:意大利的克雷莫纳(Cremona),以自十六世纪起孕育了一大批制琴大师而闻名。这座古雅的河畔小镇,鹅卵石街道见证了数百年来对制琴这一独特技艺的执着。安东尼奥·斯特拉迪瓦里(Antonio Stradivari)就出自这一传统,他在 1737 年去世前,制作了约 1100 把小提琴、中提琴、大提琴和吉他——用一位小提琴大师的名言来说,用的"只有夜莺歌唱过的树木的木材"。数百年后,斯特拉迪瓦里的小提琴仍能拍出最高价格,例如 2022 年一把以 1530 万美元成交。
And yet, the story of violins didn’t remain anchored to the cobblestones of Cremona; the evocative image of seasoned woods and varnish also applies to a very different town in Jiangsu province, China, where nearly every child studies music and factories produce almost 40 percent of the world’s violins.
然而,小提琴的故事并没有停留在克雷莫纳的鹅卵石上;那浸润了岁月感的木料与漆面的动人画面,同样适用于中国江苏省一个非常不同的小镇——那里几乎每个孩子都学音乐,工厂生产着全球近 40% 的小提琴。
In the city of Huangqiao, the rise of China’s violin-making industry took mere decades, starting with factory-like low-cost workshops in the 1980s supplying beginner instruments to eager Chinese families; the workshops then scaled rapidly through the 1990s as foreign buyers flocked to violins a fraction of the Western price. By 2007, a low-end Huangqiao violin cost around 200 RMB (about $30), a quarter the Western price and a level that still holds today.
在黄桥镇,中国小提琴制造业的崛起只用了短短几十年。它始于 1980 年代工厂式低成本作坊,为渴求的中国家庭供应入门乐器;进入 1990 年代,外国买家蜂拥而至,抢购价格仅为西方零头的提琴,作坊迅速扩张。到 2007 年,一把低端黄桥小提琴约售 200 元人民币(约 30 美元),只有西方价格的四分之一——这个水平至今未变。
Competition drove relentless specialization. Production was broken into as many as 208 steps, explains Xiaofeng Xu, the Italian-trained former chief technician at the town’s largest producer. Workers, many new to violin-making, were trained for narrow tasks from rough cutting to fine carving, varnishing, and painting. One might carve components for a thousand instruments a year—only his or her specific part. No one built a full instrument, but together they achieved a scale that the Cremona handcrafters never could. Today, the Huangqiao industrial cluster produces more than a million violins, cellos, and guitars annually.
竞争驱动了无情的专业化分工。镇上最大生产商的意大利培训出身的前首席技师徐晓峰(Xiaofeng Xu)解释说,生产被拆分成多达 208 道工序。工人——许多是制琴新手——被训练去做狭窄的任务,从粗切到精雕、上漆、涂饰。一个人一年可能为上千件乐器雕刻部件——但只是他或她负责的那一个零件。没有人做完整把琴,但合在一起,他们达到了克雷莫纳手工匠人永远无法企及的规模。今天,黄桥产业集群每年生产超过一百万把小提琴、大提琴和吉他。
As skills improved, production for mid-range violins (about $300) compressed to just fifty to sixty steps, a niche that the Chinese now dominate. “For the same quality in Europe, you pay ten times more,” says Inneo Group president Junjian Qian. “Many brands just import ours and put their own labels on. They don’t even bother to try anymore.” At the high end, luthier Xiaofeng describes training teams of five Chinese masters who handcraft violins using imported Italian spruce and Bosnian maple.
随着技艺提升,中档小提琴(约 300 美元)的生产被压缩到仅五六十道工序——这是如今中国人主导的一个细分市场。"同样品质在欧洲,你要花十倍的价格,"音诺集团(Inneo Group)总裁钱军建(Junjian Qian)说,"很多品牌只是进口我们的琴,贴上自己的标签。他们甚至不再费心自己做了。"在高端领域,制琴师晓峰描述说,他们培训了五人一组的中国大师团队,用进口的意大利云杉和波斯尼亚枫木手工制作小提琴。
Quality has followed. Chinese violins have earned awards at the Violin Society of America’s biennial competition, and in 2024, Chinese luthier Liu Zhaojun topped four hundred entrants at the Concorso Stradivari, often called the Olympics of violin-making. To be fair, the very top instruments still tend to emerge from Europe. At Music China 2025, Asia’s largest instruments expo, Chinese purveyors filled a vast hall, while a solitary corner housed just a handful of European makers. One Cremona luthier sold a handcrafted cello to a Chinese family for €25,000 ($29,000).
质量也随之跟上。中国小提琴在美国小提琴协会的两年一度竞赛中获奖;2024 年,中国制琴师刘兆军(Liu Zhaojun)在被称为"制琴界奥运会"的斯特拉迪瓦里国际提琴制作大赛中,从四百多名参赛者中拔得头筹。平心而论,最顶级的乐器仍往往出自欧洲。在 2025 年亚洲最大的乐器展中国(上海)国际乐器展览会上,中国厂商占据了偌大的展厅,而一个孤零零的角落里只有寥寥几位欧洲制琴师。一位克雷莫纳制琴师以 2.5 万欧元(2.9 万美元)向一个中国家庭卖出了一把手工大提琴。
Yet for the mainstream market, five centuries of painstaking craftsmanship met thirty years of industrial China—and China closed the distance.
然而在主流市场上,五个世纪的精工细作遇上了中国三十年的工业化——而中国拉平了差距。
Why does this matter beyond violins? Huangqiao is China in miniature. The same forces that transformed its violin industry shape the broader economy—not only in industrial equipment, smartphones, appliances, and electric vehicles, but also in software platforms, intellectual property, advanced research, and the global brands built on top of them. China’s story is not just its vast consumer market but also massive scale, breakneck speed, end-to-end supply chains, and competition so intense it forces constant, rapid innovation across both physical and digital domains.
为什么这不仅仅关乎小提琴?黄桥就是中国的缩影。改造了它的小提琴产业的同一股力量,也在塑造更广泛的经济——不仅在工业设备、智能手机、家电和电动汽车领域,也在软件平台、知识产权、前沿研究,以及建立在这些基础之上的全球品牌。中国的故事不仅是其庞大的消费市场,还有巨大的规模、惊人的速度、端到端的供应链,以及激烈到迫使实体与数字领域持续快速创新的竞争。
令人瞠目结舌的规模
A Mind-Boggling Scale
Of course, everyone knows the country has scale. Even Marco Polo, supposedly the first European to travel to what we now call China, returned to Venice in the thirteenth century having nicknamed it “Milione.” But in China, scale isn’t just relative size—it’s a size so vast it rewires how companies grow and compete.
当然,谁都知道这个国家有规模。即使是马可·波罗——据称是第一个游历我们今天所称"中国"的欧洲人——十三世纪回到威尼斯时,也给它起了个绰号叫"百万之城"。但在中国,规模不只是相对的大小——它是一种如此庞大的体量,足以重塑企业增长与竞争的方式。
In other words, China’s scale is not just a static measure of “numerical bigness.” It’s a dynamic force that consistently over-indexes: relative to its population, income level, and stage of development, China builds more infrastructure, trains more technical talent, and concentrates more industrial capacity than peer economies. That imbalance isn’t accidental. It reflects national, societal, and cultural priorities—and it’s this compounding scale that continuously generates new economic units, reshapes supply chains, and alters corporate growth trajectories. This is central to understanding China’s impact on the global economy.
换句话说,中国的规模不只是"数字大"这个静态度量。它是一种持续超配的动态力量:相对于其人口、收入水平和发展阶段,中国建设了更多基础设施,培养了更多技术人才,集中了比同等经济体更多的工业产能。这种失衡并非偶然。它反映了国家、社会与文化的优先序——正是这种复利式的规模,不断催生新的经济单元、重塑供应链、改变企业的增长轨迹。这是理解中国对全球经济影响的核心。
China has now entered a moderate-growth phase, with most economists expecting 4 to 5 percent annual GDP growth over the next few years. That’s slower than its past double-digit era—yet slowing growth doesn’t mean shrinking impact. At China’s scale, even moderate growth produces staggering absolute numbers. Each year, China still adds economic output comparable to a mid-sized economy such as Switzerland’s, and graduates more university students annually than half of Australia’s total population.
中国如今已进入中速增长阶段,多数经济学家预计未来几年 GDP 年增速为 4% 到 5%。这比过去两位数的时代慢了——但增长放缓并不意味着影响力收缩。以中国的体量,即使中速增长也会产生惊人的绝对数字。每年,中国新增的经济产出仍相当于瑞士这样的中等经济体,其年度高校毕业生人数超过澳大利亚总人口的一半。
During its boom years, China poured more concrete in three years than the US had in the entire twentieth century—and it remains a heavyweight today, producing 5.2 billion cubic meters (183.6 billion cubic feet) of pre-mixed concrete in 2023–2024, nearly half of global output. China’s 50,000 kilometers (31,000 miles) of high-speed rail network now exceed the rest of the world combined; its 190,700 kilometers (119,000 miles) of expressways exceed that in the US and EU together; and the country saw 263 airports built in two decades. When it comes to consumers, you’ll see that China Central Television’s (CCTV) Chinese New Year show grabs nearly 680 million viewers, more than five times Super Bowl 2025’s viewership.
在繁荣年代,中国三年浇筑的混凝土比美国整个二十世纪还多——它今天仍是巨无霸:2023–2024 年度生产了 52 亿立方米(1836 亿立方英尺)的商品混凝土,接近全球产量的一半。中国 5 万公里(3.1 万英里)的高铁网络如今超过世界其他地区的总和;19.07 万公里(11.9 万英里)的高速公路超过美国与欧盟之和;二十年间中国建成了 263 座机场。说到消费者,你会看到中国中央电视台(CCTV)的春节联欢晚会吸引近 6.8 亿观众,是 2025 年超级碗观众人数的五倍多。
Any number of mind-boggling stories illustrates China’s scale, but one of our favorites involves a homegrown amusement park group that includes the sixth most frequented park in the world with 12.6 million visitors a year. At the original flagship, Chimelong Safari Park in Guangzhou, visitors are immediately swallowed by vastness. Half a dozen roller coasters rise over grounds spanning more than 1,100 soccer fields, and the only surviving giant panda triplets draw millions of visitors a year. At the adjacent water park, a few minutes’ drive away, more than twenty thousand visitors crowd in and dance to DJ music in the world’s largest wave pool. At peak times it’s so packed the water vanishes under a crush of black-haired swimmers.
任何一组令人瞠目的故事都能说明中国的规模,但我们最喜欢的一个,涉及一家本土主题公园集团——它旗下拥有全球第六大客流量的公园,年游客 1260 万。在其最早的王牌园区广州长隆野生动物世界,游客一进门就被"巨大"吞噬。六座过山车耸立在占地超过 1100 个足球场的园区之上,全球唯一存活的大熊猫三胞胎每年吸引数百万游客。驱车几分钟外的相邻水上乐园,两万多名游客挤进世界最大的造浪池,随着 DJ 音乐起舞。高峰时段,人山人海,黑发泳客拥挤到看不见水面。
What makes Chimelong remarkable isn’t just its size today but its humble origins. Founder Su Zhigang started his business career by delivering pork to restaurants on his bicycle before opening his own eatery in the early 1990s. He still keeps that bicycle at home beside a life-sized portrait of Deng Xiaoping, whose reforms facilitated his rise. Zhigang was inspired to try entrepreneurship, as he once told Joe, by the line that “some regions and some people may prosper before others.”
长隆的非凡之处不仅在于它今天的规模,更在于它卑微的出身。创始人苏志刚的从商生涯,始于骑自行车给餐馆送猪肉,1990 年代初才开了自己的小饭馆。他至今把那辆自行车留在家里,旁边挂着一幅真人等大的邓小平画像——正是邓小平的改革成就了他的崛起。苏志刚曾告诉倪以理,是"让一部分地区、一部分人先富起来"这句话启发了他去尝试创业。
Growing from frying pork skewers to running six parks that host thirty million visitors required more than ambition—it demanded an ecosystem able to mobilize staff, engineers, capital, and a vast consumer base spread across a cluster of China’s mega-cities. Consider Chimelong’s customer base. Guangzhou, site of its first park, is home to nineteen million people. Within a three-hour high-speed train ride are Shenzhen, Dongguan, Zhuhai, Foshan, and Hong Kong—aggregating a regional population of more than eighty-seven million in what’s commonly called the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA); for a park operator, that’s massive potential ticket sales. In 2024, Zhigang became the first Asian entrepreneur to receive the Los Angeles–based Themed Entertainment Association’s Lifetime Achievement Award.
从炸肉串到运营六座公园、接待三千万游客,这需要的不仅是雄心——它需要一个能够调动员工、工程师、资本和庞大消费群体的生态系统,而这些消费者散布在中国一大片超级城市群中。想想长隆的客源腹地:第一座公园所在地广州,常住人口 1900 万;三小时高铁圈内还有深圳、东莞、珠海、佛山和香港——这个通常被称为粤港澳大湾区(GBA)的区域合计人口超过 8700 万。对主题公园运营商来说,这是巨大的潜在门票市场。2024 年,苏志刚成为首位获得总部位于洛杉矶的主题娱乐协会(Themed Entertainment Association)终身成就奖的亚洲企业家。
This kind of scale appears everywhere you look. China already has a vast upper-middle-and-above class—at about 450 million people—and it’s still expanding. By the end of the decade, this moneyed tier will swell by another 130 million, reaching a projected 260 million households by 2030—roughly 580 million people. And we haven’t even mentioned the 152 million households in middle- and lower-middle income tiers waiting in the wings. “There’s no niche market in China. With this scale, any slice of the market is big enough to be worth it,” as McKinsey Global Institute partner Jeongmin Seong points out.
这种规模随处可见。中国已拥有庞大的中上收入及以上阶层——约 4.5 亿人——而且还在扩大。到本十年末,这一富裕阶层将再增加 1.3 亿,预计到 2030 年达到 2.6 亿户——约 5.8 亿人。我们还没提处于中低收入和低收入阶层、随时准备入场的 1.52 亿户家庭。"中国没有利基市场。以这样的规模,任何一块市场切片都大到值得去做,"麦肯锡全球研究院合伙人成政珉(Jeongmin Seong)指出。
China’s development is sometimes best seen through the lens of a tiered-city structure. The first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen serve as national command centers for finance, government, innovation, and global engagement; some universities in these cities are now cracking the global top tier. Second-tier cities—Chengdu, Hangzhou, Wuhan, to name a few—are rising powerhouses, regional hubs that enjoy rapid growth, strong local industries, and expanding middle classes. Third-tier cities, smaller and less affluent, make up China’s vast emerging market and are home to the majority of Chinese consumers.
中国的发展有时最好通过城市分层的镜头来观察。北京、上海、广州、深圳这些一线城市是金融、政府、创新和全球交往的国家指挥中心;其中一些城市的大学如今已跻身全球一流。二线城市——成都、杭州、武汉等——是冉冉升起的强市,是享受快速增长、拥有强大本地产业和不断扩张中产阶层的区域枢纽。三线城市更小、更不富裕,构成了中国广袤的新兴市场,也是大多数中国消费者的家园。
Of course, “smaller,” in China, is always relative: a third-tier city can range from one to nearly ten million people—the population spread from Sanya to Nanyang—and by the way, there are about seventy of these cities. China’s modernization is complex, and the country is not a monolith.
当然,在中国,"更小"总是相对的:一个三线城市的人口可以从一百万到近一千万不等——人口跨度从三亚到南阳——顺便说一句,这样的城市大约有七十个。中国的现代化是复杂的,这个国家并非铁板一块。
Scale extends beyond consumers to talent. China produces more than fourteen million skilled workers annually and five million STEM graduates—the skew toward engineering over law or the liberal arts signaling what the system values. Many countries have skilled workers; few have this many, clustered this tightly. Apple CEO Tim Cook put it plainly in 2017: “China stopped being the low labor cost country many years ago. Companies come… because of the quantity of skill in one location, and the type of skill. In the US, you could have a meeting of tooling engineers and I’m not sure we could fill the room. In China, you could fill multiple football fields. It’s that vocational expertise—very deep.”
规模还延伸到消费者之外的人才。中国每年培养超过 1400 万名技术工人和 500 万名 STEM 毕业生——向工程而非法律或文科的倾斜,昭示着这个体系看重什么。许多国家都有技术工人;但很少有国家有这么多、且如此密集地聚集。苹果 CEO 蒂姆·库克 2017 年直言不讳:"中国很多年前就不再是劳动力低成本国家了。公司来这里……是因为一个地方的技能数量,以及技能的种类。在美国,你可以召集一次模具工程师会议,我不确定我们能坐满一个房间。在中国,你能坐满好几个足球场。就是那种职业专长——非常深厚。"
Infrastructure gives this scale physical form. In Guizhou’s mountainous southwest, crews have erected some of the world’s tallest bridges; the Huajiang Gorge Bridge, completed in 2025, rises 625 meters above the river below. China built its high-speed rail network from zero to the world’s largest in little more than a decade—accounting for roughly 70 percent of all high-speed rail built globally over the past decade. By 2023, it was scheduling 3.7 billion train trips a year. Railways are connective tissue—binding a vast, geographically dispersed economy into a single operating system.
基础设施给了这种规模以实体形态。在贵州多山的西南地区,工程团队建起了世界上最高的几座桥梁;2025 年完工的花江峡谷大桥,桥面距下方河谷 625 米。中国的高铁网络在短短十余年内从零建成世界第一——占过去十年全球新建高铁的约 70%。到 2023 年,它每年排定 37 亿次列车出行。铁路是连接组织——将一个幅员辽阔、地理分散的经济体绑定成一个单一的操作系统。
Scale is also energy, which isn’t about keeping the lights on but rather creating a platform for competitive advantage across technology, innovation, and industry, transforming energy from a cost center into an enabling resource. In 2024, China’s industrial enterprises generated 10,100 terawatt-hours of electricity, or about 2.3 times that of the US, at 60 percent of the cost. Perhaps even more impressive, in the first half of 2025 alone, China installed new solar power systems with a total capacity of 210 gigawatts—more than the entire installed US solar base and almost double that of Germany.
规模也是能源。能源的意义不只是让灯亮着,而是为技术、创新与产业创造竞争优势的平台,把能源从成本中心转化为赋能资源。2024 年,中国工业企业发电 10,100 太瓦时,约为美国的 2.3 倍,而成本只有美国的 60%。也许更令人印象深刻的是,仅 2025 年上半年,中国就新增并网太阳能装机 210 吉瓦——超过美国全部累计太阳能装机,几乎是德国的两倍。
Despite the already impressive numbers, China’s scale is still routinely underestimated. Those trying to gauge the country’s potential often fail to take note of purchasing power parity (PPP)—which adjusts for exchange rates and prices—by which China has been the world’s largest economy since 2016.
尽管数字已经很惊人,中国的规模仍常常被低估。试图衡量这个国家潜力的人,往往没有注意到购买力平价(PPP)——它调整了汇率与价格因素——按此衡量,中国自 2016 年起就已是世界第一大经济体。
Jim Kralik, an American investor who has lived and worked in China for more than thirty years and now leads Linden Street Capital and Milestone Capital, puts it this way: “If you look at the actual bundles of daily life in aggregate—how much space people live in, how many washing machines, phones, coffees, or services they consume—the scale of what people consume in China now exceeds any other country, even if income per person remains lower.”
在中国生活和工作超过三十年、如今掌管 Linden Street Capital 与 Milestone Capital 的美国投资人吉姆·克拉利克(Jim Kralik)这样说:"如果你把日常生活的实际消费篮加总来看——人们住多大空间、消费多少台洗衣机、多少部手机、多少杯咖啡、多少服务——中国人如今消费的总规模超过任何其他国家,即使人均收入仍然更低。"
The reason is simple: unit costs are far lower in China. A Starbucks cappuccino with a breakfast sandwich might run $16 in New York; in China, the same Starbucks set costs about $7.50—or $6 with a monthly card, and with promotions and delivery discounts, consumers can routinely find deals below $5. Moreover, local chains offer options for as little as $3. And there is a no-tipping culture. The pattern holds for TVs, delivery services, burgers, and everyday goods. That means nominal GDP understates China’s scale: Chinese incomes buy more units—more “stuff”—than equivalent incomes in the US or Europe. That volume effect is why, in PPP terms, China is already the world’s largest consumer economy.
原因很简单:中国的单位成本低得多。一杯星巴克卡布奇诺配一份早餐三明治在纽约可能要 16 美元;在中国,同样的星巴克套餐约 7.5 美元——办月卡 6 美元,加上促销和配送折扣,消费者常能找到 5 美元以下的价位。而且本地连锁品牌还有 3 美元起的选项。这里还没有小费文化。这个规律同样适用于电视、配送服务、汉堡和日常商品。这意味着名义 GDP 低估了中国的规模:同等收入在中国能买到更多"东西",比在美国或欧洲买到的更多。正是这种数量效应,使得按购买力平价计算,中国已是世界最大的消费经济体。
China’s scale is part of its strategic advantage. It locks in supply, creates a domestic market large enough to test and refine global products, and concentrates talent at a density no other economy can match. And the scale effect is amplified by Chinese consumers, who are among the world’s most discerning.
中国的规模是其战略优势的一部分。它锁定了供给,创造了一个大到足以测试和打磨全球产品的国内市场,并以其他经济体无法匹敌的密度集聚人才。而规模效应又被中国消费者放大——他们是世界上最挑剔的消费者之一。
世界上最善变、最挑剔的消费者
The World’s Most Fickle and Demanding Consumers
The Chinese consumer base isn’t just massive—it’s complex, aspirational, and restless. China is fully mobile first: discovery, promotion, payment, and delivery happen with a tap, and thirty-minute delivery is routine. Consumers don’t just buy—they force companies to evolve.
中国消费群体不只是庞大——它复杂、向上、永不满足。中国是彻底的移动优先:发现、促销、支付、配送,一次点击全部完成,30 分钟送达是家常便饭。消费者不只是买东西——他们倒逼企业进化。
Shopping in China barely resembles the rest of the world. QR-based mobile wallets collapse discovery and purchase into a single action. Our colleague Xin, for instance, buys everything on his phone—groceries, dinner, even screws for home repair—and his seventy-one-year-old mother does, too, except for the green onions she forgets and buys downstairs. The result is a hyper-engaged, always-on consumer.
中国的购物方式与世界其他地方几乎完全不同。基于二维码的手机钱包把发现与购买压缩成一个动作。比如我们的同事 Xin,所有东西都在手机上买——日用品、晚餐,甚至家里维修用的螺丝钉——他七十一岁的母亲也一样,除了偶尔忘了买的小葱,会下楼顺手带一把。结果就是一群极度投入、永远在线的消费者。
Increasingly, this consumption is moving from physical goods to services. Services now account for roughly half of household spending, with growth concentrated in dining, travel, health, education, and on-demand local offerings. Mobile platforms have collapsed discovery, booking, payment, and fulfillment into a single flow, allowing services—from tutoring to home repairs—to scale as efficiently as physical goods.
这种消费正越来越多地从实物商品转向服务。服务如今约占家庭支出的一半,增长集中在餐饮、旅游、健康、教育和本地即时服务。移动平台把发现、预订、支付和履约压缩成一条单一流程,让服务——从家教到上门维修——能像实物商品一样高效地规模化。
The short-form video platform Douyin, ByteDance’s China-focused equivalent of TikTok, sits at the center of social commerce—though it started as an entertainment platform that later monetized through shopping. Livestreaming isn’t fringe; it’s prime time. Celebrity hosts, key opinion leaders (KOLs)—influencers—and even key opinion consumers (KOCs) with as little as two hundred followers move millions of units, and people trust them more than they do advertisements. “In China today, consumption is about trust and tribes,” says Henry Zhang, the Chinese contemporary novelist and poet best-known by his pen name Feng Tang. “People follow the tribes’ shared values, taste, and aesthetics, and with short video and livestreaming, what you see can be bought instantly. A phone, a trusted voice, and a community are enough—and this model works because it fits human nature better than the old model of brands and advertising.”
短视频平台抖音——字节跳动面向中国的 TikTok 版本——处于社交电商的中心——尽管它最初是个娱乐平台,后来才通过购物变现。直播不是边缘玩法,而是黄金时段。明星主播、关键意见领袖(KOL)——也就是网红——甚至只有两百个粉丝的关键意见消费者(KOC),都能卖出数百万件商品,而且人们信任他们胜过信任广告。"今天在中国的消费,关乎信任与圈层,"中国当代小说家、诗人,以笔名冯唐最为人熟知的张海鹏(Henry Zhang)说,"人们追随圈层共享的价值观、品味和审美,而借助短视频和直播,你看到的东西可以立刻买下。一部手机、一个可信的声音、一个社区,就足够了——这个模式之所以奏效,是因为它比旧的品牌与广告模式更契合人性。"
On video platforms such as Bilibili, iQIYI, and Tencent Video, comments fly across the screen, turning passive viewing into a group event. When one of our Shanghai colleagues is searching for advice on topics as varied as which sunscreen is recommended to travel visa requirements, she turns to Xiaohongshu, or RedNote, a mash-up of Instagram aesthetics, TikTok videos, Pinterest taste, and Amazon-style reviews.
在哔哩哔哩、爱奇艺、腾讯视频等视频平台上,弹幕满屏飞过,把被动观看变成集体活动。我们一位上海同事在寻找各类建议——从该买哪款防晒霜到旅游签证要求——时,会打开小红书(RedNote),一个融合了 Instagram 的美学、TikTok 的视频、Pinterest 的品味和亚马逊式评价的混合体。
This digital machine normalizes what we call hyper-switching: constant comparison across prices and specs, with full transparency—from the composition of skin serums to the chipset inside a refrigerator. As Natixis’s chief Asia-Pacific economist Alicia García-Herrero notes, price sensitivity isn’t thrift; it’s power. “I’ve never seen anything like the way Chinese consumers compare over pennies,” Alicia says.
这台数字机器让一种我们称之为"超级切换"的行为成为常态:在价格与参数之间不断比较,信息完全透明——从精华液的成分到冰箱里的芯片组。正如法国外贸银行(Natixis)亚太区首席经济学家艾西亚·加西亚-埃雷罗(Alicia García-Herrero)所指出的,对价格敏感不是节俭,而是权力。"我从没见过像中国消费者那样为几分钱锱铢必较的样子,"艾西亚说。
This ecosystem turns consumers into an active force, giving them a direct line to companies—pushing them to cut prices, raise standards, and speed up launches. “Chinese consumers are more spoiled than anywhere else because of the sheer competition between brands and the volume of interactions they have with companies,” says Hai Ye, a McKinsey senior partner leading the growth, marketing, and sales practice. “Companies in the US, Europe, and Japan don’t respond to the consumer like this.”
这个生态系统把消费者变成一股主动的力量,让他们与公司直接连线——逼着企业降价、提高标准、加快新品上市。"中国消费者比其他任何地方都被惯坏了,因为品牌之间的竞争之激烈、他们与公司之间的交互量之大,"麦肯锡资深合伙人叶海(Hai Ye)说,他领导增长、营销与销售业务线,"美国、欧洲和日本的公司不会这样响应消费者。"
Loyalty is fluid. The Chinese keep a short list and rotate through it. “They’ll try things,” Hai says. “If you’re not good enough, they’ll drop you. If you get it right, they’ll scale you faster than anywhere on the planet.” One colleague trusted the Chinese EV brand Li Auto with autonomous driving for his young family only after seventy software updates; he ventures, tentatively, that he’s “loyal” now but will still explore rivals. “It’s speed dating: mutual exploration,” says Michael Hui, a partner at Bain Capital.
忠诚度是流动的。中国消费者心里有一份很短的候选清单,然后在其中轮换。"他们会试,"叶海说,"如果你不够好,他们就会抛弃你。如果你做对了,他们会以地球上任何地方都无法比拟的速度把你做大。"一位同事在经历了七十次软件更新之后,才敢让中国电动车品牌理想(Li Auto)为他的小家庭提供自动驾驶;他试探性地表示自己现在算是"忠诚"了,但仍会探索竞品。"这就是快速配对:双向探索,"贝恩资本合伙人许立庆(Michael Hui)说。
Why does the consumer behave this way? We have to understand the velocity of change that most Chinese have experienced. One colleague likes to tell her origin story: in the 1970s, her father borrowed a neighbor’s bicycle with an attached flatbed to cart her mother, who was in labor, to a Qingdao hospital; she grew up, studied at Peking University, built a business career, and bought her parents a home and a car—typical for her cohort. Her parents grew up in material scarcity, when meat was an occasional treat, not a daily expectation; their daughter delivered them into affluence in a journey that—from bicycles to SUVs, ration coupons to luxury malls—took other nations nearly a century.
消费者为什么会这样?我们必须理解大多数中国人经历过的变化速度。一位同事喜欢讲她的出身故事:1970 年代,她父亲借了邻居一辆带平板拖斗的自行车,把临产的母亲送去青岛的医院;她长大后考上北大、闯出事业,给父母买了房和车——在她的同龄人中这是典型。她的父母在物质匮乏中长大,那时肉是偶尔的犒赏,不是日常的期待;而他们的女儿把他们带进了富足——这段旅程,从自行车到 SUV、从粮票到奢侈品商场,别的国家走了将近一个世纪。
This upward mobility shapes expectations. The average consumer couldn’t have imagined such material progress, and our business clients only know breakneck growth. We see a generation experiencing true choice for the first time: Who can blame them for being hardwired for ambition? What they’ve lived through has seemed an impossible fantasy.
这种向上的流动性塑造了预期。普通消费者当年无法想象这样的物质进步,而我们的商业客户只认得狂飙式的增长。我们看到一代人第一次真正体验"选择":他们天生就充满抱负,这又怎能责怪他们?他们亲历的一切,曾经看起来像不可能实现的幻想。
The one-child policy—discontinued in 2016 but still shaping society today—sharpened this psychology further: families concentrate spending on the child’s education, health, and experiences. McKinsey finds categories like education, food, health, and travel treated as protected investments in the quality of life, rather than discretionary spending or luxuries. Young adults, despite high youth unemployment, still spend on dining, entertainment, and wellness. Seniors remain disciplined spenders and “invest” in travel, nutrition, and their children. This focus comes with trade-offs: Chinese consumers readily cut back on status goods, home upgrades, big-ticket appliances, and convenience premiums.
独生子女政策——2016 年废止,但至今仍在塑造社会——进一步强化了这种心理:家庭把支出集中在孩子的教育、健康和体验上。麦肯锡发现,教育、食品、健康、旅游等类目被视为对生活质量的保护性投资,而不是可支配开支或奢侈品。年轻成年人尽管面临高企的青年失业率,仍然在餐饮、娱乐和健康上花钱。老年人依然是有纪律的消费者,会"投资"于旅游、营养和子女。这种专注也伴随着取舍:中国消费者会毫不犹豫地削减炫耀性商品、家居升级、大件家电和便利溢价。
What the Chinese consumer wants is shifting from status to meaning. Ownership once signaled success; now consumption signals identity. China is the world’s first mega-market where “consumerism itself becomes identity,” says Derek Sulger, longtime investor and co-owner of luxury brand Shanghai Tang. “Consumption needs to be understood as a social movement.”
中国消费者想要的,正从"身份象征"转向"意义"。拥有曾标志着成功;如今消费标志着身份认同。中国是世界上第一个"消费主义本身成为身份"的超级市场,资深投资人、奢侈品牌上海滩(Shanghai Tang)的联合所有者苏德瑞(Derek Sulger)说。"消费需要被理解为一场社会运动。"
The line could be drawn historically: post-WTO consumers chased Western badges—Porsche, Louis Vuitton, Hermès. Post-COVID consumers have inverted the lens and chase quality of experience and technology instead—seamless digital services, health and wellness features, personalized products, and, in autos—infotainment and connectivity.
这条分界线可以按历史划出:入世(WTO)后的消费者追捧西方标识——保时捷、路易威登、爱马仕。疫情后的消费者反转了镜头,转而追求体验品质与技术——无缝的数字服务、健康与养生功能、个性化产品,以及汽车领域的信息娱乐与互联。
Generational divides are stark. In the West, luxury habits span generations: the woman who wore Dior at her wedding now buys Dior for her daughter. German families might either be “Mercedes families” or “BMW families.” In China, the generations split sharply: the grandmother who lived through the 1960s values thrift, the 1990s mother sees foreign languages and brands as progress, and the post-2010 granddaughter treats luxury as something to experience rather than aspire to. Today’s “six-pockets” young people—only children supported by two parents and two sets of grandparents—are digital natives who, as parents themselves, choose robotics over piano and immersive travel over camps. Meanwhile, 77 percent of high-income seniors in top-tier cities say they’re confident about the future. Both ends of the demographic hourglass are upgrading into experiences at once.
代际差异十分鲜明。在西方,奢侈习惯代代相传:婚礼上穿迪奥的女人,如今给女儿也买迪奥。德国家庭要么是"奔驰家庭",要么是"宝马家庭"。在中国,代际之间截然分裂:经历过 1960 年代的祖母珍视节俭,1990 年代的母亲把外语和品牌视为进步,而 2010 后出生的孙女把奢侈当作一种体验,而非向往的对象。今天的"六个口袋"年轻人——被父母和两对祖父母共同供养的独生子女——是数字原住民;他们自己成为父母后,给孩子选机器人课而不是钢琴课,选沉浸式旅行而不是夏令营。与此同时,一线城市 77% 的高收入老年人表示对未来有信心。人口沙漏的两端,同时都在向体验升级。
“Identity through consumption” also explains China’s version of tightening belts in a sluggish economy. Consumer confidence has been at historic lows in the past two years. Nevertheless, they’re not giving up aspiration—they’re reallocating to preserve lifestyle. In search of cheaper hotels after a Hong Kong concert, they’ll road-trip back to Shenzhen, even sleep in cars over national holidays—then pour the saved money into food and fun.
"通过消费确立身份"也解释了经济疲软时期中国的"勒紧腰带"。过去两年,消费者信心处于历史低位。然而,他们并没有放弃追求——而是在重新配置支出以保住生活方式。看完香港演唱会,为了找更便宜的酒店,他们会连夜开车回深圳,甚至在长假期间睡在车里——然后把省下的钱砸进美食和玩乐。
Every demographic pocket has its own aspirations and definition of value. As one luxury client puts it, “While Europe has old money and the Middle East has oil money, in China if one pillar falls, you have many others to supplement.” But we shouldn’t over-generalize. No single narrative fits 1.4 billion people, and even within one generation, diversity in income, education, and risk appetite is enormous.
每一个细分人群都有自己的抱负和对价值的定义。正如一位奢侈品牌客户所说:"欧洲有老钱,中东有石油钱,而在中国,如果一根柱子倒了,还有很多其他柱子来补。"但我们不应过度概括。没有任何单一叙事能套在 14 亿人身上,即使在同代人内部,收入、教育和风险偏好的差异也极其巨大。
Overall, what most Chinese consumers have in common is high expectations, an abundance of information, and many choices—making China one of the world’s most demanding retail markets. And the Chinese are sitting on a gross national savings rate around 44 percent—far above the EU’s 25 percent and the US’s low-by-comparison 17 percent in 2025. As each generation spends more than the last, a massive wave of future demand is building—and waiting for entrepreneurs to tap into it.
总体而言,大多数中国消费者的共同点是高期望、海量信息和众多选择——这使中国成为世界上最苛刻的零售市场之一。而且中国人的国民总储蓄率在 44% 左右——远高于欧盟的 25% 和 2025 年相比之下偏低的美国 17%。随着每一代人比上一代花得更多,一波巨大的未来需求正在蓄积——等待着企业家去挖掘。
From bicycles to cars, from scarcity to abundance, the Chinese consumer has leapt a distance in twenty-five years that took others a century. Joe’s weekly commute since 2002 from Hong Kong to Shenzhen bears witness to that compression of time. Twenty years ago, the drive meant navigating dirt roads and clogged checkpoints into a city that felt like an industrial outpost. “It felt like I was traveling back in time,” he recalls. Joe remembers getting out of the car at the Huanggang checkpoint, walking across the short boundary on foot to get his “return-home permit” card checked, and grabbing a meal in a bare-bones cafeteria while Chinese customs processed the driver and car separately—a sensory reminder that he was on the mainland.
从自行车到汽车,从匮乏到丰裕,中国消费者用二十五年跳过了别人一个世纪的历程。倪以理自 2002 年以来每周从香港到深圳的通勤,见证了这种时间的压缩。二十年前,这趟车程意味着在土路和拥堵的口岸中穿行,进入一座感觉像工业前哨的城市。"感觉像是在穿越回过去,"他回忆道。倪还记得在皇岗口岸下车,步行走过一小段边界,出示"回乡证"查验,然后在中国边检单独处理司机和车辆时,在简陋的快餐店随便吃一顿——所有感官都在提醒他:自己已身处内地。
The boundary is still crowded, and Joe still gets out of his car to cross—but facial recognition clears him in seconds, long before the car follows. Shenzhen now feels like tomorrow: high-speed rail hubs, eight-lane expressways, glass towers that multiply by the quarter. “Every month I saw a new city,” he says. Now he feels like he’s stepping into the future.
边界依然拥挤,倪仍然要下车过关——但人脸识别几秒钟就放行他,远远快于后面跟着的汽车。深圳如今感觉像"明天":高铁枢纽、八车道高速、每个季度都在翻倍增长玻璃塔楼。"我每个月都看到一座新城,"他说。现在他感觉自己正走进未来。
Nick’s “China speed” story centers on a Chinese dairy company that liked to bombard the market with new, exciting yogurt drinks, the only way to stay relevant with incredibly fickle customers. One day he watched the R&D chief approve what felt like a thousand yogurt experiments in one go—whether it was cheese, lychee-infused, green-tea-flavored, or sesame. Sample batches were made on Monday; by Friday, social data and retailer feedback had picked the winners. “The market spoke in a week—and they’d already moved on,” Nick recalls. This company went from start-up to Hong Kong-listed within five years to one of China’s top dairy companies a few years later—and now sponsors the FIFA World Cup.
梁敦临的"中国速度"故事,主角是一家中国乳业公司——它喜欢用新奇的酸奶饮品狂轰市场,这是在善变得难以置信的顾客面前保持存在感的唯一方式。有一天,他看到研发主管一口气批下感觉像上千个酸奶实验——无论是芝士味、荔枝味、绿茶味还是芝麻味。周一批量打样;到周五,社交数据和零售商反馈已经选出了赢家。"市场在一周内表态——而他们已经往前跑了,"梁回忆。这家公司五年内从初创走到港交所上市,几年后又跻身中国顶级乳企——如今还是国际足联世界杯的赞助商。
“China speed” means that an electronic parts supplier can hire eight hundred engineers to re-design a production line within two months. Clothing retailer SHEIN can reinvent fast fashion to become “on-demand” fashion, designing and producing new clothes in micro-batches of, say, a hundred garments within days, not seasons. Coffee retailers can open thousands of shops in a year, leveraging the resources and enthusiasm of entrepreneurs across the country. We’re talking about system-wide speed that also includes the pace of data-feedback loops linking consumers, developers, and manufacturers, as well as decisions around capital allocation and organizational adaptation.
"中国速度"意味着电子零部件供应商可以在两个月内雇佣八百名工程师重新设计一条生产线。服装零售商 SHEIN 能重塑快时尚,使之成为"按需时尚":以一百件左右的极小批量设计和生产新衣,用天而不是用季度来计算。咖啡零售商一年能开出数千家门店,借助全国创业者的资源与热情。我们说的是系统级的全链路速度,还包括连接消费者、开发者与制造商的数据反馈回路的速度,以及资本配置和组织适应方面的决策速度。
AstraZeneca’s executive vice president, international, Iskra Reic, now based in Shanghai, had her “aha moment” watching the company’s Qingdao facility come alive. “It was one year from signing the memorandum of understanding to actually opening the first packaging line,” Iskra tells us. “The speed, pace, efficiency—all to AstraZeneca standards—were amazing. China’s deep expertise in research and clinical development will deliver new medicines at unmatched speed.”
阿斯利康国际业务执行副总裁、现驻上海的艾思珂(Iskra Reic),在目睹公司青岛工厂拔地而起时经历了她的"顿悟时刻"。"从签署谅解备忘录到真正开出第一条包装线,只用了一年,"艾思珂告诉我们,"那种速度、节奏和效率——全部达到阿斯利康标准——令人惊叹。中国在研发和临床开发方面的深厚专长,将以无与伦比的速度带来新药。"
Traditional business cycles that once stretched over years have collapsed into months—or even weeks. In Germany, designing and launching a new car model typically took five years or even more. Today, Volkswagen Group CEO Oliver Blume says the company is “using Chinese speed to improve our processes,” noting that new platforms are now developed in only two years. In China, local manufacturers routinely complete the same cycle in eighteen to twenty-four months, and Mercedes, Audi, VW, and BMW have now set up R&D centers in China and radically shorten their innovation and development cycles to compete. A sportswear executive tells us that given how quickly fast followers copy, he thinks of China as a “big bucket of speed.”
曾经要拖上数年的传统商业周期,已塌缩为几个月——甚至几周。在德国,设计并推出一款新车型通常要花五年甚至更久。如今,大众集团 CEO 奥博穆(Oliver Blume)说公司正"用中国速度改进我们的流程",指出新平台如今只需两年就能开发出来。在中国,本土制造商通常用十八到二十四个月就能完成同样的周期,而奔驰、奥迪、大众和宝马都已在华设立研发中心,大幅缩短创新与开发周期以参与竞争。一位运动用品高管告诉我们,鉴于快速追随者抄袭之快,他把中国看作"一个巨大的速度桶"。
In digital finance, employees of the Italian joint venture partner to 360 Digitech founder Jun Xu’s new start-up work thirty-five hours a week and ask the China side to slow down. “They say it’s too much for us. We can’t follow your speed,” Jun tells us. “My little China start-up works six days a week, twelve hours a day.”
在数字金融领域,360 数科创始人徐军(Jun Xu)新创公司的意大利合资伙伴,员工每周工作三十五个小时,还请求中方放慢节奏。"他们说这太多了,我们跟不上你们的速度,"徐军告诉我们,"我这家小小的中国创业公司,一周工作六天,每天十二小时。"
“China speed” has a compounding effect. Fast decisions accelerate innovation, which sharpens competition, which then forces even faster execution. Nick calls the speed of failure critical to this cycle. “Chinese companies can stop immediately and move on—they know how to fail fast,” says Nick. “Multinationals typically take longer, ironically because of more consensus-driven decision-making and ‘face’ associated with failure. We joke that in China it’s ‘fire, fire, aim,’ while elsewhere it’s ‘aim, aim, shoot’ or ‘aim, aim, opportunity gone.’ ”
"中国速度"有复利效应。快速决策加速创新,创新加剧竞争,竞争又倒逼更快的执行。梁敦临认为"失败的速度"对这一循环至关重要。"中国公司能立即止损、继续前进——它们懂得快速试错,"梁说,"跨国公司通常要花更久,讽刺的是,因为更强调共识驱动的决策和与失败挂钩的'面子'。我们开玩笑说,在中国是'开火、开火、瞄准',而在别处是'瞄准、瞄准、射击',或者'瞄准、瞄准、机会已逝'。"
If “China speed” isn’t fast enough, try “Shenzhen speed,” a phrase that became famous in 1984 after that city’s International Trade Center was built at a rate of one floor every three days. Shenzhen itself became a symbol of the speed, boldness, and innovation bubbling up in the surrounding metro area of eighteen million, which is the headquarters location of tech giants Tencent and Huawei and drone maker DJI. “Shenzhen speed” isn’t reserved just for that city; consider that Beijing Daxing International Airport, the world’s largest single-terminal airport, went from initial design to full commercial operation in just four years before its 2019 opening. Compare that with London Heathrow’s runway expansion, which has been in the planning stages for thirteen years and won’t be ready until the mid-2030s.
如果"中国速度"还不够快,那就试试"深圳速度"——这个词在 1984 年深圳国贸大厦以"三天一层楼"的速度建成后闻名全国。深圳本身成为速度、胆识与创新的象征,这些气质在它周围 1800 万人口的城市群里持续喷涌——这里是科技巨头腾讯、华为和无人机制造商大疆的总部所在地。"深圳速度"不只属于那一座城市;想一想世界最大的单体航站楼北京大兴国际机场,从最初设计到全面商业运营只用了短短四年,2019 年就如期启用。对比一下伦敦希思罗机场的跑道扩建——规划阶段已经进行了十三年,要到 2030 年代中期才能完工。
For foreign firms, the lesson is clear: adapt to China’s speed, or risk irrelevance. Some have made the shift, while others will likely be headed for the exits. “Anyone can tap into that speed because it’s an open ecosystem,” says Karel Eloot, a McKinsey senior partner co-leading the global metals and mining practice. “In the West, you do a lot of preparation. In China, you must scale immediately, so you launch ‘half perfect’ and ‘not yet amazing’ and then use short cycle times to iterate generations two, three, and four.”
对外国企业来说,教训很明确:适应中国的速度,否则就有被边缘化的风险。有些人已经完成了转变,另一些人则很可能走向退出。"任何人都能接入那种速度,因为那是一个开放的生态系统,"麦肯锡资深合伙人、共同领导全球金属与矿业业务的艾拓(Karel Eloot)说,"在西方,你会做大量准备。在中国,你必须立即上规模,所以你要带着'半成品'和'还不出彩'的产品上市,然后用短周期迭代出第二代、第三代、第四代。"
Speed, of course, has trade-offs; sometimes what suffers is quality, safety, or compliance. Critics argue that some Chinese companies ship out products before sufficient quality checks at defect or recall rates unacceptable in mature markets. Many multinationals say they can’t match the pace—not for lack of ability but because they can’t take the same legal or reputational risk. A flawed product in Western markets can trigger recalls, lawsuits, and lasting brand damage; in China, the same risks apply—but Chinese companies have mastered the art of acknowledging faults, apologizing, and iterating in public rather than perfecting in advance. China’s speed is real, it drives progress, and standards are rising, but the risk tolerance remains fundamentally different than in the US and Europe.
当然,速度是有代价的;有时牺牲的是质量、安全或合规。批评者认为,一些中国公司在充分质检之前就把产品推向市场,缺陷率或召回率达到成熟市场无法接受的水平。许多跨国公司表示自己跟不上这个节奏——不是因为没能力,而是因为承受不了同样的法律或声誉风险。一件有缺陷的产品在西方市场可能引发召回、诉讼和持久的品牌损害;在中国,同样的风险也存在——但中国公司掌握了当众承认错误、道歉并迭代的艺术,而不是预先做到尽善尽美。中国的速度是真实的,它驱动着进步,标准也在提高,但风险容忍度与欧美相比仍有本质差异。
That difference shapes perception. Some online shoppers might pay close attention to country-of-origin labels and associate “Made in China” with quality or safety concerns, even as they continue to buy large volumes of Chinese-made products through Temu, SHEIN, and other platforms. Roughly two-thirds of safety warnings around consumer products in the US in 2024 involved Chinese companies, reflecting both China’s manufacturing dominance and its uneven compliance at the low end.
这种差异塑造了认知。一些网购者可能会密切关注原产地标签,把"中国制造"与质量或安全隐忧联系起来——即便他们继续通过 Temu、SHEIN 等平台大量购买中国制造的产品。2024 年美国约三分之二的消费品安全警告涉及中国公司,这既反映了中国制造业的主导地位,也反映了其在低端领域参差不齐的合规水平。
Yet China now produces both some of the world’s most rudimentary goods—for example, textiles, toys, and chargers—and also some of its most sophisticated, as in drones, EVs, and mobile phones. While some companies will meet global standards, their successes will continue to be overshadowed by highly visible failures elsewhere in the ecosystem. China’s advantage isn’t just speed but a willingness to accept risk early and correct later at scale—the question is whether global trust in Chinese companies can rise as quickly as their capabilities have.
然而,中国如今既生产世界上最初级的产品——例如纺织品、玩具和充电器——也生产一些最精密的产品,比如无人机、电动车和手机。虽然有些公司能达到全球标准,但它们的光环仍会被生态中其他角落高调的失败所遮蔽。中国的优势不只是速度,更是一种"早期承担风险、后期大规模纠错"的意愿——问题是,全球对中国公司的信任能否像它们的能力一样快速提升。
中国的供应链生态
China’s Supply Chain Ecosystem
The forces of speed, scale, and demand become most visible in China’s supply chain—an ecosystem with no global parallel. It’s a complete industrial ecosystem that puts materials, tooling, suppliers, and engineers within immediate reach—enabling unusually efficient cost structures and capital deployment. In extreme but not rare cases, building a plant in China costs roughly 20 percent of what the same facility would cost in the US and can be completed in roughly 20 percent of the time. More typically, companies see 50 percent lower capex and 50 percent faster build times.
速度、规模与需求的力量,在中国的供应链中体现得最为明显——这是一个全球无出其右的生态系统。它是一个完整的产业生态,让材料、模具、供应商和工程师触手可及——从而实现了异常高效的成本结构与资本部署。在极端但不罕见的情况下,在中国建一座工厂的成本约为美国同样设施的 20%,工期约为美国的 20%。更常见的是,公司能实现资本开支降低 50%、建设速度加快 50%。
This helps explain what happened when Apple’s main Zhengzhou plant—at its peak home to hundreds of thousands of workers—was disrupted during the 2022 COVID lockdowns. Apple pushed to diversify iPhone production, with suppliers exploring Vietnam and India, among other sites. Yet within a year, Foxconn, Apple’s main final assembly partner, had only shifted about 15 percent of output, according to Kelvin Pan, chief innovation officer of AAC Technologies, one of Apple’s primary suppliers of speakers, haptics, and thermal components. “Once COVID ended, the Zhengzhou operation ramped back up again to full speed,” Kelvin says.
这有助于解释 2022 年新冠封控期间苹果郑州主力工厂——高峰期拥有数十万工人——停摆时发生了什么。苹果推动 iPhone 生产多元化,供应商探索越南、印度等地。然而据瑞声科技(AAC Technologies)创新总监彭志威(Kelvin Pan)介绍——该公司是苹果扬声器、触感与散热组件的主要供应商之一——一年之内,苹果的主要整机组装伙伴富士康仅转移了约 15% 的产能。"疫情一结束,郑州工厂又重新满速运转起来,"彭志威说。
The reason is simple: China’s supply chain advantage isn’t just capacity but also muscle memory built over three decades of moving up the value chain. Firms from Hong Kong and Taiwan brought contract manufacturing; Japan brought precision tooling; Europe layered in quality systems; and America pushed scale and automation. “For any other country to come even close, we’d need to invest there for the next ten to fifteen years because that’s how long it took China to build this incredibly rich ecosystem of materials, tooling, operations, skilled labor, and know-how,” says Cedric Leleu, a McKinsey partner in digital transformation services, who has recently spent time with global manufacturers expanding beyond China.
原因很简单:中国的供应链优势不只是产能,还有三十年沿价值链攀升积累下来的"肌肉记忆"。来自香港和台湾的企业带来了代工制造;日本带来了精密模具;欧洲叠加了质量体系;美国推动了规模与自动化。"任何其他国家要想接近这个水平,我们都得在那里投资十到十五年——因为中国正是用了这么久,才建成这个由材料、模具、运营、熟练劳动力和工艺诀窍构成的无与伦比的生态系统,"麦肯锡数字化转型服务合伙人李乐(Cedric Leleu)说,他最近一直在与中国之外扩张的全球制造商打交道。
This supply chain ecosystem—physically clustered across the Greater Bay Area and the Yangtze River Delta and digitally linked through millions of WeChat workgroups, business-to-business (B2B) marketplaces, and factory-to-factory programming interfaces—now produces the world’s most sophisticated hardware with precision and speed: hundreds of design tweaks a week, and automation delivered in weeks not quarters. Chinese suppliers feed not only Apple but also Chinese and Western companies such as Volkswagen, Samsung, Lenovo, and Huawei. Tesla has more than four hundred Chinese suppliers clustered around its Shanghai Gigafactory.
这个供应链生态——物理上聚集在大湾区和长三角,数字上通过数百万个微信群、企业对企业(B2B)交易平台和工厂对工厂的编程接口连接——如今正以精密度与速度生产着世界上最精密的硬件:每周数百次设计调整,自动化交付以周计而不是以季度计。中国供应商不仅服务苹果,也服务大众、三星、联想、华为等中外企业。特斯拉在上海超级工厂周围聚集了四百多家中国供应商。
In consumer electronics, this ecosystem allows AAC Technologies to move with extraordinary speed. When tasked with supporting a new smartphone model, AAC can ramp up from zero to eight fully operational manufacturing lines in just three months, investing about $100 million to green-light capacity for forty million units a year—at half the cost of comparable overseas production. “We make changes to every sub-station every single day,” Kelvin tells us. “You can imagine the volume of changes—hundreds every week—just to keep improving. And the customers are there every day checking the key performance indicators (KPIs) and metrics for each station.” Cedric is more direct: “You can ramp ten thousand people in a few days. You can also adjust them in a few days. You can flex labor by the hour. You can’t do that outside China.”
在消费电子领域,这个生态让瑞声科技能以非凡的速度行动。接到支持一款新智能手机型号的任务后,瑞声可以在短短三个月内从零起步建成八条全面运转的生产线,投入约 1 亿美元,为年产 4000 万台铺平产能——成本只有海外同类产能的一半。"我们每天都在改每一个工位,"彭志威告诉我们,"你可以想象改动量有多大——每周几百处——只为持续改进。而且客户每天都来检查每个工位的关键绩效指标(KPI)和度量。"李乐说得更直接:"你能在几天内拉起来一万人。也能在几天内调整他们。你能按小时弹性调配劳动力。在中国以外你做不到这些。"
And it’s not just speed; it’s also depth. In China, if supplier A can’t do it, supplier B, C, D, E, F can, and they’re often in the same district. A client’s Monterrey, Mexico, plant is so green and technologically advanced as to be declared a World Economic Forum “lighthouse”—but it’s not in the Chinese supplier ecosystem. “In China, you can send a request to a thousand suppliers and get twenty bids back within the hour; in Mexico, it’s different,” says Liang Zhou, a McKinsey associate partner and tech manufacturing expert.
而且不只是速度,还有深度。在中国,如果供应商 A 做不了,供应商 B、C、D、E、F 都能做,而且它们往往就在同一个片区。一位客户位于墨西哥蒙特雷的工厂,绿色环保和技术先进到被世界经济论坛评为"灯塔工厂"——但它不在中国供应商生态之中。"在中国,你可以向一千家供应商发询价,一小时内收到二十份报价;在墨西哥,情况就不同了,"麦肯锡副合伙人、科技制造专家周亮(Liang Zhou)说。
China’s edge comes with a cost: the same competitiveness that produces the advantage also squeezes margins thin. A global supplier’s COO told us, “China’s supply chain is like a vast ocean—but the water is shallow for profits.” Work-life balance sometimes feels non-existent, especially compared with what occurs at that client’s Mexico plant, where workers enjoy a “Bring Your Pet to Work” day.
中国的优势是有代价的:带来优势的那种竞争力,同时也把利润压得很薄。一位全球供应商的首席运营官告诉我们:"中国的供应链像一片浩瀚的海洋——但对利润来说,水很浅。"工作与生活的平衡有时感觉根本不存在,尤其是与那位客户墨西哥工厂的情况相比——那里的工人享有"带宠物上班日"。
Diversification is real and happening—AAC has expanded into Vietnam and Eastern Europe; Foxconn has been deepening and expanding its already global footprint with new investments in Mexico, the US, India, and other locations; and some low-end sectors like textiles and leather have moved out for good, especially the export-oriented factories. But the “small stuff” supply chain—plastics, zippers, buttons, accessories—is still firmly in China. With a domestic market of this size, “Made in China, for China” isn’t going anywhere. And as you climb into advanced manufacturing—electronics, EVs, green tech—the high-value work of design, automation, materials, and R&D remains firmly anchored at home.
多元化是真实的、正在发生的——瑞声已扩展到越南和东欧;富士康一直在深化和扩大其本就全球化的布局,在墨西哥、美国、印度等地新增投资;纺织、皮革等一些低端行业已永久迁出,尤其是面向出口的工厂。但"小件"供应链——塑料、拉链、纽扣、辅料——依然牢牢扎根在中国。以如此庞大的国内市场,"中国制造、中国消费"哪里也不会去。而当你爬向先进制造——电子、电动车、绿色科技——设计、自动化、材料和研发这些高价值环节,依然牢牢锚定在国门之内。
Massive scale, breakneck speed, demanding consumers, and an irreplaceable supply chain separate China from every other market. And when these dense, information-rich ecosystems meet the ambition of the Chinese entrepreneur, the business landscape can become a “survival of the fittest” brawl. That competitive metabolism is China’s final differentiator.
巨大的规模、惊人的速度、挑剔的消费者和不可替代的供应链,把中国与所有其他市场区分开来。而当这些密集、信息丰富的生态系统遇上中国企业家的雄心,商业版图就会变成一场"适者生存"的混战。这种竞争代谢,是中国的终极差异化因素。